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We examine the relationships with ﬁrm performance of the internal pay gap
among individual members of the top management team (TMT) and the com-
pensation level of TMT members relative to their industry peers. We ﬁnd that
pay gap is positively related to ﬁrm performance and that this positive relation
is stronger when the TMT pay level is higher than the industry median. How-
ever, we do not observe such eﬀects in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
in which both the executive managerial market and compensation are
government-regulated. We also document that cutting central SOE managers’
pay level can increase ﬁrm value, whereas doing so for local SOE managers has
the opposite eﬀect. Our ﬁndings have important implications for research on
TMT compensation as well as for policy makers considering SOE compensa-
tion reform.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Top management team (TMT) incentive-based contract design is a topic of considerable interest to
academics and practitioners. It is an especially important issue in China because both the level of TMTgapore,
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have widened signiﬁcantly following the introduction of market-oriented reforms in China in 1978. Our focus
in this study is on implications of the variation and the level of TMT pay for ﬁrm performance.
We deﬁne the variation in pay among the TMT as the diﬀerence between the CEO’s pay and that of the
other executives in the TMT, and refer to this diﬀerence as ‘‘TMT pay gap.” TMT pay gap thus concerns
the reward that non-CEO executives can expect if they are promoted to CEO. Prior research makes conﬂicting
predictions about whether a large TMT pay gap promotes competition among TMT members and whether it
enhances ﬁrm performance. Tournament theory, on the one hand, posits that a pay gap among diﬀerent
organizational levels provides a competition incentive such that the larger the pay gap, the better the ﬁrm’s
performance. Social comparison theory, on the other hand, stresses teamwork and cooperation within the
TMT, and thus posits that a smaller pay gap can improve satisfaction and willingness to cooperate, thereby
boosting ﬁrm performance. However, whether a team engages in competition or cooperation is an empirical
issue (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003), and this relationship is moderated by many factors, including task
dependence and the individual incentive system (Shaw et al., 2002; Kepes et al., 2009).
In addition to TMT pay gap, the level of TMT pay is also an important factor that aﬀects ﬁrm perfor-
mance. We deﬁne ‘‘TMT pay level” as the diﬀerence between the average pay of the TMT and the average
pay of industry peer TMTs (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992), and refer to this diﬀerence as ‘‘TMT pay level.”
TMT pay level thus reﬂects the external competitiveness of the ﬁrm’s compensation policy (He and Hao,
2014). TMT pay level may have both a direct and an indirect eﬀect on ﬁrm performance. First, as an impor-
tant factor in the TMT’s incentive system, TMT pay level has direct implications for ﬁrm performance. Sec-
ond, TMT pay level may also have an indirect eﬀect on ﬁrm performance because it moderates the relationship
between TMT pay gap and ﬁrm performance. Excluding the eﬀects of pay level from the model would thus
result in a biased estimate of the relationship between TMT pay gap and ﬁrm performance.2 However, most
of the related research in China does not consider this interactive eﬀect of TMT pay level (Lin et al., 2003;
Chen and Zhang, 2006). Additionally, ﬁrms often use industry peers as a benchmark when negotiating con-
tracts with top executives (Jiang, 2011). Diﬀerent TMT pay levels lead to an external comparison between
ﬁrms, and top executives and then form corresponding levels of satisfaction with their compensation, which
in turn inﬂuences the competition–cooperation relationship within the TMT.
As indicated earlier, we conduct our empirical analysis using compensation data from Chinese ﬁrms. The
market-oriented reforms introduced in China in 1978 have led to substantial increases in the compensation
levels of some executives, especially those at monopoly and public welfare ﬁrms. Further, the pay gap among
Chinese ﬁrms’ TMTs has considerably widened during this period (Zhang, 2008; Li and Hu, 2012). Concerned
about the widening pay gap and increasing compensation level, China’s Central Political Bureau passed a
resolution on 29 August 2014 to reform the pay system for the responsible persons of centrally managed com-
panies. The program focuses on ﬁve main areas: (1) improvement of the reward system, (2) adjustment of the
pay structure, (3) strengthening of supervision, (4) regulation of the pay level, and (5) treatment standardiza-
tion. The last two areas, in particular, are intended to address unreasonably high incomes and pay gaps to
promote social justice.
‘‘Pay gap” can refer either to the income gap between executives and general staﬀ or the gap between TMT
members’ pay. Chinese are generally more sensitive to the former gap, particularly since the round of pay cuts
and layoﬀs in 2008 that saw executives retain high pay levels (Liu and Sun, 2010). However, because the TMT
is at the highest managerial level of the ﬁrm, the within-team pay gap is related to the distribution of limited
compensation among executives, and thus plays an important role in the TMT incentive system. Moreover, if
the overall TMT pay level is adjusted, the question is whether and how income should be distributed among
team members to ensure the eﬀectiveness of the compensation incentive mechanism. To answer this question,
we explore the relationship between a TMT’s overall pay level and the pay gap among its members.
Since 2005, it has been mandatory for China’s listed ﬁrms to disclose their executives’ compensation. In this
study, we examine whether TMT pay level aﬀects the relationship between a TMT pay gap and ﬁrm2 For example, Knoeber and Thurman (1994) point out that Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b) ignore the incentive eﬀect of prize level
when using the behavior of professional golfers to examine tournament theory. Because the prize structure was identical across
tournaments, larger prize gaps were always the result of higher prize levels.
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rent reform of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we further analyze the relationship between TMT pay
level and pay gap incentive eﬃciency under diﬀerent ownership conditions. We ﬁnd that TMT pay level can
moderate pay gap incentive eﬃciency and that a pay gap within a TMT exerts stronger tournament eﬀects
when TMT members’ pay level is higher than that of their industry peers. In Chinese SOEs, however, because
both the market for executives and their compensation are regulated by the government, even a high pay level
fails to stimulate tournament eﬀects in the TMT. In central SOEs, cutting managers’ pay level can increase the
value of the ﬁrm. However, doing so in local SOEs is likely to dampen tournament incentive eﬃciency. For
local SOEs that provide high TMT pay level, a larger TMT pay gap is associated with better ﬁrm performance.
This study makes several contributions. First, it enriches the literature on TMT pay incentives. These incen-
tives comprise the entire team’s pay level (the ﬁrst distribution) and its internal pay gap (the second distribu-
tion) (Zhang et al., 2012). Many studies discuss these two aspects of incentives separately, but few combine
them. Our ﬁndings show that the TMT pay level inﬂuences the team’s internal distribution eﬃciency. When
the pay level is higher than that of industry peers, a larger pay gap induces better tournament incentives and
performance. However, when the pay level is lower than that of industry peers, a larger pay gap may be harm-
ful to ﬁrm performance.
Second, our study adds to the literature on pay gaps. Tournament theory and social comparison theory do
not coincide in terms of their predictions of the pay gap incentive eﬀect. We argue that the applicability of the
two theories depends on external equity. When top executives perceive external fairness, tournament theory is
more applicable; when they perceive less external fairness, social comparison theory is more applicable. This
ﬁnding also supplements Brown et al. (2003).
Third, our study contributes to the literature on Chinese SOE reform. Wu et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2014)
report that excess compensation does not have incentive eﬀects. Similarly, our ﬁndings show that excess pay
does not promote internal competition in the TMT. For central SOEs, reducing top managers’ pay level can
stimulate managerial competition and enhance ﬁrm value, which lends support to the recently passed and
implemented decision to reduce the compensation of central SOEs’ top executives. At the same time, our
results suggest that the reform policy for local SOEs should not simply follow than that of central SOEs.
Reducing pay levels may not be the optimal decision for local SOEs, although adjusting the internal pay struc-
ture may enhance ﬁrm performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and hypothesis
development, and Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 reports the descriptive statistics and the
results of the empirical analyses, while Section 5 discusses the results of robustness tests. Section 6 presents
the results of additional analyses and Section 7 concludes the paper.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Literature on pay gap and pay level
There is a sizeable body of research on the relationship between TMT pay gap and ﬁrm performance. One
strand of research is tournament theory, developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981), which posits that although a
non-CEO’s salary may double within a day following the promotion to CEO, it would be diﬃcult to argue
that his/her ability has also doubled within a day. Thus, it is diﬃcult to explain the pay gap in TMTs through
recourse to traditional economic theory, which argues that pay levels are determined by marginal output (e.g.,
Lin et al., 2003). Tournament theory argues that under the conditions of cooperative eﬀort and task interde-
pendence, it is not feasible to set executives’ pay based on their marginal output when monitoring is diﬃcult.
Although marginal output-based pay for executives might seem more equitable, a large pay gap can encourage
rank-order competition, thereby improving ﬁrm performance. Numerous studies provide empirical evidence
consistent with the predictions of tournament theory. For example, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,
1990b) study the behavior of professional golf players, and ﬁnd that increases in the diﬀerential between prizes
provide them with an incentive to exert more eﬀort. Main et al. (1993) report a positive relationship between
pay gap and return on assets for a sample of more than 200 ﬁrms and 2000 executives per year over a ﬁve-year
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empirical evidence of the theory’s eﬃcacy.
Another strand of research is social comparison theory, which, in contrast to tournament theory, argues
that people pay close attention to equity in most situations. Particularly when a team is working jointly toward
the same objective, team members are likely to not only being concerned about their own income, but also to
compare it with those of their fellow team members to judge whether the income distribution is fair. If a
TMT’s internal pay gap is suﬃciently large to seem inequitable to non-CEO executives, dissatisfaction with
the income distribution may reduce their willingness to cooperate, thus damaging ﬁrm performance. There-
fore, social comparison theory places greater stress on the importance of a compressed pay distribution in
TMTs (Lazear, 1989; Pfeﬀer and Langton, 1993; Cowherd and Levine, 1992). O’Reilly et al. (1988) suggest
that a compressed pay distribution and smaller pay gap encourage collaboration among employees, and
are thus beneﬁcial to ﬁrm performance. Drago and Garvey (1998), Bloom (1999), Hibbs and Locking
(2000) and Fredrickson et al. (2010) also provide empirical evidence in support of social comparison theory.
The two theories make contradictory predictions about the relationship between a TMT pay gap and ﬁrm
performance. Tournament theory argues that a larger TMT pay gap provides an incentive for executive com-
petition, whereas social comparison theory posits that a larger TMT pay gap causes non-CEO executives to
feel deprived and is not conducive to cooperation. In reality, most members of organizations, particularly top
executives, work toward a common objective and require interdependence or collaboration. Cooperation and
competition coexist among executives in a TMT, and we thus need empirical evidence to determine which
theory is dominant in a speciﬁc setting. For example, Lin et al. (2003) propose that in Chinese listed ﬁrms,
tournament incentives’ positive eﬀect exceeds the negative eﬀect brought about by feelings of unfairness
and non-cooperative behavior. They thus conclude that tournament theory is more suitable for explaining
the relationship between TMT pay gaps and ﬁrm performance in Chinese ﬁrms.
However, the literature in this area is not limited to studies seeking supportive empirical evidence for these
two theories. Scholars have discussed the aforementioned relationship in a variety of contexts (Trevor and
Wazeter, 2006). Siegel and Hambrick (2005) examine the interactive eﬀect of technological intensiveness
and TMT pay gaps on ﬁrm performance, ﬁnding that in high-technology ﬁrms that require greater technolog-
ical intensiveness, pay gaps are detrimental to ﬁrm performance. Kepes et al. (2009) report a positive relation-
ship between pay gaps and ﬁrm performance when those gaps are attributable to the use of performance-based
pay because employees feel that the distribution process is fair. Brown et al. (2003) use a large database of
hospitals to examine the modulating eﬀect of an organization’s pay level on internal pay gap incentive
eﬃciency.
As noted, ‘‘pay level” in this paper refers to top executives’ average pay level relative to that of their indus-
try peers (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992). Milkovich and Newman (2002) describe pay levels as leading, match-
ing or lagging the market. The traditional economic literature primarily uses eﬃciency wage theory, proposed
by Akerlof and Yellen (1986), to explain why a ﬁrm’s pay level aﬀects its performance. If the ﬁrm’s pay level
exceeds that of its peers, it will ﬁnd it easier to attract, retain and motivate outstanding talent. The Chinese
literature explains the inﬂuence of pay level on ﬁrm performance primarily from the perspective of external
equity. Wu et al. (2010) estimate the excess compensation of top managers as a measure of external equity,
and ﬁnd that high pay levels motivate non-SOE managers, but have no eﬀect on SOE top managers. Qi
and Zou (2014) use relative quantiles of top executives’ average pay as a measure of external pay equity,
reporting that a higher pay level always increases managers’ perceptions of fairness, and thus motivates them
to exert greater eﬀort to boost ﬁrm performance. From the perspective of the managerial market, Li et al.
(2014) demonstrate that only when a TMT’s pay level leads the market does excess compensation for top man-
agers provide positive incentives. Therefore, the TMT’s pay level oﬀers the same incentives to top managers as
an internal TMT pay gap. Accordingly, in order to focus on the incentives of the latter, we must exclude the
direct and indirect eﬀects of pay level. In other words, a study on the eﬀects of pay gaps on ﬁrm performance
must control for pay level.
The Chinese literature on pay gaps considers both the gap between management and workers and that
among managers within TMTs. The Chinese tend to be more sensitive to the former because of the traditional
pull of the harmonious society principle, and thus the pay distribution within TMTs has received little atten-
tion. Interestingly, however, almost all existing papers on the consequences of an internal TMT pay gap are
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what limited by their failure to control for pay level. Zhang (2007) examines the relationship between within-
TMT pay gaps and ﬁrm performance while holding pay level constant, and ﬁnds a negative relationship,
which is consistent with the prediction of social comparison theory.3 This result suggests that, for Chinese
listed ﬁrms, the TMT pay level may be an inﬂuential factor in TMT pay gap eﬃciency.
At present, the Chinese literature on TMT pay level and pay gap is fragmented. Many studies discuss one
or the other in isolation, but few consider them together. In a ﬁeld survey of 376 general workers from 59
departments of Chinese ﬁrms, He and Hao (2014) ﬁnd that within-department pay diﬀerences exert a negative
eﬀect on workers’ emotional commitment only when the overall departmental pay level is lower than that of
other departments. In this study, we combine TMT pay levels with a study of TMT pay gap eﬃciency, in an
attempt to contribute to research on top management compensation mechanisms in Chinese listed ﬁrms.2.2. Hypothesis development
As previously discussed, tournament theory emphasizes competition within the organization, whereas
social comparison theory stresses cooperation and fairness within the organization. Colquitt et al. (2001)
suggest that perceived equity is the result of a subjective judgment process and that subjectivity is reﬂected
primarily in the choice of reference object. Many studies propose that employees compare their salaries with
several reference objects (Brown, 2001; Hills, 1980; Law and Wong, 1998). Oldman et al. (1986) divide the
comparison with reference objects into internal organizational justice and external organizational justice. A
within-TMT pay gap inﬂuences internal organizational justice, whereas TMT pay level inﬂuences external
organizational justice. These two kinds of justice are not independent, but rather interact with each other
(Trevor and Wazeter, 2006). It has been mandatory for Chinese listed ﬁrms to disclose their executives’
compensation since 2005, which makes it easier for top executives to obtain payment information on their
peers and to engage in external comparison.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) propose a two-player tournament model in which the players’ eﬀort and perfor-
mance levels are positively related to the size of the reward, but have nothing to do with the prize level. Their
model assumes the prize level to be exogenously given, which limits the possibility of players making external
comparisons. However, this assumption does not hold for workers’ wages in most ﬁrms. Eﬃciency wage the-
ory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) states that providing employees with a market-leading wage is beneﬁcial to the
ﬁrm because employees are more willing to remain in a high-paying organization. Messersmith et al. (2011)
ﬁnd that top executive turnover is less likely when executives receive a higher proportion of overall TMT com-
pensation. Not only is original talent retained, but other outstanding managers are also attracted to the team.
Therefore, when there is a within-TMT pay gap, a high TMT pay level exerts a natural incentive eﬀect on the
CEO and, more importantly, the negative eﬀect on non-CEOs arising from the internal pay gap is partially
oﬀset. Bloom and Michel (2002) suggest that if a ﬁrm’s payment level is higher than the market’s, many of
the negative consequences of an internal pay gap are alleviated. Frank (1985) proposes that it is easier for
employees to accept an unfair wage distribution when their wages are higher than their marginal output.
Trevor and Wazeter (2006) ﬁnd that when employees are in a lower pay position internally, a higher pay
position externally enhances their perception of pay equity. Hence, an internal pay gap is less likely to exert
negative eﬀects and more likely to create tournament incentives.
However, if the TMT’s pay level lags the market, all of the team’s top executives are likely to perceive a low
degree of external equity, that is, to perceive themselves at a disadvantage relative to their industry peers.
Although a large internal pay gap may somewhat alleviate the CEO’s dissatisfaction, it will worsen that of
non-CEOs, who are in a poorer pay position relative to both internal and external referents. Such double
discontent with their compensation may well reduce their willingness to cooperate (Deutsch, 1985; Pfeﬀer
and Langton, 1993) or even encourage them to desert the ﬁrm (Bloom and Michel, 2002). Both outcomes3 Chen et al. (2011) also control for the average pay level of the three top executives other than the CEO in their model. Their results are
consistent with tournament theory. However, even when these top three executives’ pay is controlled for, a larger pay gap always
accompanies higher CEO pay, and thus it is still diﬃcult to distinguish whether the positive relationship between a pay gap and ﬁrm
performance stems from high CEO pay or a large pay gap.
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underpaid will move to other companies, where they can obtain ability-matched compensation, and those who
choose to remain on a poorly paid team may be incompetent and thus struggle to ﬁnd a better paid job.
Messersmith et al. (2011) provide evidence to show that reducing overall TMT compensation increases exec-
utive turnover. Therefore, a low TMT pay level and large within-team pay gap induce a number of negative
eﬀects, such as a lack of cooperation and higher turnover among non-CEOs, thereby oﬀsetting the positive
tournament incentives of the pay gap to a large degree. It is possible that the negative eﬀect of an internal
pay gap is dominant when overall pay is below a certain level.
The preceding discussion suggests that a TMT pay gap can produce positive tournament incentives,
especially when the TMT pay level is above than that of peer ﬁrms. It also suggests that a TMT pay gap
can produce negative eﬀects, especially when external equity perceptions brought about by comparison with
other TMT pay levels inﬂuence internal equity perceptions induced by the pay gap. Although it is unclear
whether the positive tournament eﬀects or the negative eﬀects of internal inequities dominate, it is clear from
the above discussion that the positive tournament eﬀects of the TMT pay gap will be more positive when the
TMT pay level is above than that of peer ﬁrms, and the negative eﬀects are more negative when the TMT pay
level is below than that of peer ﬁrms. This implies that the diﬀerence in the relationship between the TMT pay
gap and performance will be positive for higher versus lower TMT pay levels. Therefore, we formulate our ﬁrst
hypothesis as follows:
H1. The relationship between TMT pay gap and ﬁrm performance is likely to be more positive when TMT
pay level is higher than that of peer ﬁrms.
Although there is considerable evidence supporting the predictions of tournament theory, its eﬃcacy in
China is unclear because of the unique features of China’s institutional environment that considerably diﬀer
from those of mature market economies. For example, China has many SOEs whose top managers earn higher
average pay levels than their non-SOE counterparts, and the TMT pay gap is signiﬁcantly lower in SOEs than
in non-SOEs. The primary reason for this discrepancy is that the compensation of SOE top managers is
regulated by the Chinese government.
Given these diﬀerences, a question of interest is whether tournament theory is capable of explaining the
incentives of top managers in Chinese SOEs. Chinese scholars (e.g., Zhou and Zhu, 2010) suggest that
the tournament incentive mechanism is actually encouraged by China’s institutional environment. Because
the government is the ownership representative of the people, it has a natural information disadvantage. Also,
SOE managers are multitaskers. It is thus diﬃcult for the government to ﬁnd appropriate measures to evaluate
SOE managers, and tournament promotion based on relative performance is a widely used measure. More-
over, competence for the CEO position is also judged by political promotion, as most SOE managers are
appointed by the government and also have an administrative ranking within the government. Although
China has attempted in recent years to implement non-administrative SOE reform, many top managers still
treat promotion within the SOE as a way to further their political careers. Yang et al. (2013) study the
‘‘quasi-oﬃcial” promotion mechanism in central SOEs. They assess whether internal promotion within an
SOE’s TMT is more political than that within a non-SOE’s TMT and whether the CEOs of SOEs are able
to obtain more political proﬁts,4 such as political rent-seeking opportunities and transfers to government
departments. Therefore, even a very small within-TMT pay gap in an SOE can create tournament incentives
and motivate managers.
Of course, under China’s tradition of egalitarian thought, the requirement for a fair income distribution
may oﬀset the positive eﬀects of such a pay gap to some extent. However, we are not concerned with predicting
the direction of a pay gap’s net eﬀects, but rather with determining how the TMT pay level, relative to the
market or to industry peers, aﬀects TMT pay gap incentives in ﬁrms with diﬀerent ownership types.
First, the compensation that SOE top managers receive is government-regulated and separated from
market conditions. Thus, their disclosed pay level is not necessarily indicative of the competitiveness of their4 It should be noted that political proﬁts here do not equate to non-monetary income. Non-monetary income refers to such beneﬁts as
reputation and status after promotion to CEO, whereas political proﬁts refer speciﬁcally to the beneﬁts to the executive’s post-promotion
political career.
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alternative means of compensating SOE managers (Chen et al., 2005). Thus, these managers’ disclosed com-
pensation does not fully reﬂect their incentives. They have more implicit incentives that are not sensitive to pay
comparisons with peers. For example, Li et al. (2014) suggest that even if SOE managers obtain a higher pay
level than their industry peers, excess payment does not bring any added incentives. However, if SOE man-
agers, most of whom are appointed by the government, obtain a lower pay level than their peers, even if they
also have an external perception of unfairness, they are unlikely to slack oﬀ at work or desert their positions
because they are concerned about their careers in the state-owned system. In summary, the TMT pay level in
SOEs has little eﬀect on the input and output of top managers.
As previously noted, the premise that the TMT pay level moderates the eﬀects of a TMT pay gap on ﬁrm
performance is based on the assumption that top managers compare themselves with external referents,
thereby exacerbating the perception of internal injustice induced by the pay gap. In non-SOEs, compensation
information on top managers is relatively more transparent and focused on monetary incentives (Lu et al.,
2012), and the median values of pay in the same industry are more often used as a benchmark (Jiang,
2011). Hence, non-SOE managers are more concerned with peer comparisons than their SOE counterparts.
Moreover, because of the relatively high marketization level of non-SOE managers, professional managers
can ﬂow freely in the market, and can thus choose job-hopping, slacking oﬀ at work or deserting their position
in response to a pay gap-induced perception of injustice, which in turn damages ﬁrm performance. SOE man-
agers, in contrast, are not sensitive to the competitiveness of their pay level, and thus external compensation
comparisons have little eﬀect on internal TMT competition and cooperation. This discussion leads to our
second hypothesis:
H2. The eﬀect of TMT pay level on the relationship between TMT pay gap and ﬁrm performance will be more
pronounced for non-SOEs than for SOEs.3. Research design
3.1. Data and sample selection
Executive compensation data and other ﬁrm characteristic data are sourced from the China Stock Market &
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. It has been mandatory for Chinese listed ﬁrms to disclose their
executives’ compensation details since 2005. Accordingly, our sample period spans 2005–2012, and the sample
contains all Chinese listed ﬁrms with available data in that period. We deﬁne TMT members as all those who
occupy amanagement position.Members of boards of directors and supervisors, who receive only a ﬁxed bonus,
are excluded. The top managers in our sample include general managers, deputy general managers, chief engi-
neers, chief accountants, and chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers. The general manager, president or CEO of the ﬁrm are
deﬁned as the CEO5 (Liao et al., 2009), and all other managers as non-CEOs. After collecting executive compen-
sation data from theCSMARdatabase, we screened the datamanually according to position titles. The screening
steps were as follows: (1) obtain the comprehensive management file and the executive individual compensation file
from the CSMARdatabase and check the CEO compensation data; (2) drop observations if the CEO changed in
the current year6; and (3) drop observations if CEO compensation was not disclosed or the CEO received only a
ﬁxed bonus. After screening, we had 11,589 valid CEO observations. We then screened non-CEO compensation
data from the executive individual compensation file by the aforementioned position titles.
After removing (1) 163 ﬁnancial companies, (2) 566 companies for which we could not calculate the TMT
pay gap because CEO compensation was lower than the median compensation for non-CEOs,7 (3) 1935 The titles of the chief managers in Chinese listed ﬁrms are not consistent, with some called general manager and some called president.
In this paper, we uniformly refer to them as CEOs.
6 If the CEO changed in the current year, then the reported CEO compensation in that year did not constitute data for a whole year,
possibly leading to large deviations in calculating pay gap.
7 As in Liao et al. (2009), this condition might arise if the CEO receives only part of his or her compensation from this ﬁrm or if
specialists who are entitled to higher compensation are hired as non-CEOs.
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284 observations that received special treatment, we were left with 9186 valid ﬁrm-level observations for our
empirical analysis.3.2. Variable definitions and model specification
In accordance with the foregoing theoretical analysis and relevant research (Kale et al., 2009; Chen et al.,
2011; Zhang, 2007), we use the following model (1) to examine how a ﬁrm’s TMT pay level inﬂuences the
relation between an internal TMT pay gap on ﬁrm performance:8 Mi
the list
9 ThPERF t ¼ b0 þ b1GAP t þ b2PLt þ b3GAPt  PLt þ b4SOEt þ b5LEV t þ b6SGROW t þ b7SIZEt
þ b8TOP1t þ b9CEOAget þ b10BOARDt þ b11INDEPBt þ b12DUALt þ b13MKRt
þ b14Optiont þ
X
Industryt þ
X
Yeart þ et ð1Þwhere PERF is either a measure of accounting performance (ROA) or market performance (TOBINQ).
GAP refers to the TMT pay gap, our main variable of interest. Following Bognanno (2001), Kale et al.
(2009), Chen et al. (2011) and Kini and Williams (2012), we deﬁne GAP as the reward received after a
non-CEO executive is promoted to CEO. We use two measures of GAP. The ﬁrst measure, GAP_1 = ln
(CEO pay–median pay of non-CEOs),9 where ‘‘ln” refers to the natural logarithm, and the second measure,
GAP_2 = CEO pay/median pay of non-CEOs, in accordance with Lin et al. (2003), Zhang (2008) and
Hambrick and Siegel (1997).
PL measures the TMT average pay level relative to the median of the average pay levels of all other ﬁrms in
the same industry. It represents the external competitiveness of the TMT’s pay. PL equals 1 if the ﬁrm’s aver-
age TMT pay is higher than the yearly median level of ﬁrms in the same industry, and 0 otherwise.
The other control variables, including ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁrm governance, are deﬁned as in the liter-
ature (Chen et al., 2011; Lin and Lu, 2009). For example, an SOE (ownership status) value of 1 indicates that
the ﬁrm is state-owned, whereas an SOE value of 0 indicates it is not. Xu et al. (2006) suggest that whether the
controlling shareholder is state-owned or non-state-owned has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance.
The liability-asset ratio (LEV) is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets. Myers (1977) and Jensen
(1986) both ﬁnd LEV to aﬀect ﬁrm performance, although the former reports a negative eﬀect and the latter
a positive eﬀect. Sales growth (SGROW) represents the ﬁrm’s rate of growth, and is equal to the diﬀerence
between current-year sales and previous-year sales divided by previous-year sales. The other control variables
are deﬁned in Table 1. We also control for industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Endogeneity is a serious concern when studying the relationship between pay gap and ﬁrm performance. Li
and Hu (2012) suggest that there is a natural positive relationship between these two variables in Chinese
SOEs. Kale et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011), Lin and Lu (2009) and Kini and Williams (2012) all adopt instru-
mental variable (IV) estimation or two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation to control for the endogenous
relationship between pay gap and ﬁrm performance. We choose lagged TMT pay gap (LGAP) and median
TMT pay gap in the same industry (MedianGAP) as the IVs for GAP. Kale et al. (2009) suggest that TMT
pay gap is positively associated with the median GAP of industry peers.
There is also concern about endogeneity in the relationship between TMT pay level and ﬁrm performance,
as ﬁrms with a higher pay level are likely to have better performance. To address this concern, we follow Fang
(2012) and Wu et al. (2010) and estimate a TMT’s excess pay level after removing the eﬀects of ﬁrm perfor-
mance, ﬁrm characteristics and other factors. We use the following model (2) to estimate the excess pay level
(Core et al., 1999; Fang, 2012).ssing-value observations stem primarily from our need for data from two consecutive years. If a ﬁrm was listed in the sample period,
ing year is that ﬁrm’s ﬁrst year, and no data are available for the previous year.
e results are similar when we use the mean of non-CEO pay, instead of the median.
10 Th
11 Bec
(2005)
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Name Variable Deﬁnition
Firm Performance ROA Net income/ending total assets
TOBINQ (Market value of tradable shares + net assets + market value of net debt)/ending
total assets
TMT Pay Gap GAP_1 ln (CEO pay–median pay of non-CEOs)
GAP_2 CEO pay/median pay of non-CEOs
LGAP Lagged GAP (GAP_1 or GAP_2)
MedianGAP Median GAP (GAP_1 or GAP_2) value of each industry in each year
TMT Pay Level PL Dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm i’s average TMT pay is higher than the median
TMT pay of ﬁrms in the same industry each year, and 0 otherwise
UF Excess pay of the TMT, estimated as the residuals of model (2)
Firm/Executive Characteristics SOE Ownership status, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is state-owned, and 0
otherwise
LEV Total debt/total assets
SGROW Sales growth rate = (sales revenue of current year  sales revenue of previous year)/
sales revenue of previous year
SIZE ln (ending total assets)
CEOAge ln (CEO age)
Option Dummy variable that equals 1 if the top executives have been granted stock options,
and 0 otherwise
Firm Governance TOP1 Percentage of outstanding shares held by the ﬁrm’s largest shareholder
BOARD Number of directors on the ﬁrm’s board
OUT Number of independent directors/number of directors of the board
DUAL Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson, and 0 otherwise
MKR Based on the Chinese regional market index estimated by Fan and Wang (2007),
MKR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is in a region with a market index
higher than the median value, and 0 otherwise
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þ b8MHOLDt þ b9BMt þ et ð2Þwhere LnCOMPt is the natural logarithm of the TMT’s average pay, ROAt1 is lagged ﬁrm performance,
MHOLD is the TMT’s average shareholding ratio, BM is the ratio of book value to market value of equity,
and the other variables are as deﬁned in Table 1.
We ﬁrst estimate model (2) for each industry-year and use the residuals from this model as our estimate of
excess pay of the TMT. We also use this excess pay measure as the IV estimator for TMT pay level.
Returning to model (1), the interaction between TMT pay level and TMT pay gap may also suﬀer from an
endogeneity problem. If we use the IVs for GAP and PL, the interaction term GAP  PL should also use the
interaction of these IVs. Therefore, we use four IVs, namely LGAP,MedianGAP, UF and LGAP  UF, for the
three endogenous variables, GAP, PL and GAP  PL, in model (1). All of our IVs satisfy relevance and valid-
ity criteria.10
According to H1, if a higher TMT pay level is accompanied by better TMT pay gap-induced tournament
incentives, the regression coeﬃcient on GAP  PL should be positive and signiﬁcant,11 and, according to H2,
that positive relationship should be stronger in the non-SOE subsample.ese tests include unidentiﬁable inspection, the weak identiﬁcation test and the Sargan test.
ause a TMT pay gap may have positive or negative eﬀects, we do not predict GAP’s direction in model (1) as Siegel and Hambrick
do.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for main variables.
Variable Number of observations Mean Minimum Median Maximum Standard deviation
ROA 9186 0.040 0.389 0.037 0.208 0.057
TOBINQ 9186 1.727 0.714 1.370 7.222 1.083
PL_DIF 9186 175.098 36.825 149.563 564.233 112.872
PAY_GAP 9186 18.646 0.500 10.847 150.466 24.216
GAP_1 9186 11.552 8.476 11.594 14.366 1.123
GAP_2 9186 1.642 1.000 1.429 4.814 0.658
PL 9186 0.527 0 1 1 0.499
SOE 9186 0.561 0 1 1 0.496
LEV 9186 0.474 0.050 0.489 1.000 0.204
SGROW 9186 0.211 0.778 0.144 4.317 0.480
SIZE 9186 21.667 18.698 21.522 25.620 1.180
CEOAge 9186 3.853 3.219 3.850 4.317 0.133
TOP1 9186 36.647 9.000 34.795 75.889 15.279
OUT 9186 0.362 0.091 0.333 0.800 0.052
BOARD 9186 9.192 3 9 18 1.856
DUAL 9186 0.185 0 0 1 0.388
MKR 9186 0.784 0 1 1 0.412
Option 9186 0.054 0 0 1 0.227
Note: PL_DIF is the range of TMT average pay in each industry, that is, the diﬀerence between the highest and lowest average pay.
PL_DIF and PAY_GAP are all in ten thousands Yuan.
Table 3
Correlations between main variables.
ROA TOBINQ GAP_1 GAP_2 PL SOE
ROA 1
TOBINQ 0.246*** 1
GAP_1 0.217*** 0.022** 1
GAP_2 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.597*** 1
PL 0.205*** 0.030*** 0.466*** 0.004 1
SOE 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.122*** 0.212*** 0.097*** 1
* Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables in the 2005–2012 sample period. The mean
(median) values of performance measures ROA and TOBINQ are 0.040 (0.037) and 1.727 (1.370), respectively,
and those of GAP_1 and GAP_2 are 11.552 (11.594) and 1.642 (1.429), respectively. All of the variables are
reasonably distributed without extreme observations. The unscaled values of TMT pay gap (PAY_GAP) indi-
cate an average diﬀerence between CEO pay and median non-CEO pay of about 180,000 yuan. However, the
diﬀerence varies widely across the sample, ranging from 5000 yuan to 1,500,000 yuan. The average PL value is
0.527, which means 52.7% of ﬁrms oﬀer a TMT pay level that is higher than the median pay level in the same
industry. The mean across industries in the range of average TMT pay in an industry (PL_DIF) is about
1,750,000 yuan, showing that even in the same industry, average TMT pay can diﬀer widely. Table 2 also
shows that 56.1% of the sample ﬁrms are SOEs, and that 18.5% of the ﬁrms have a CEO and chairperson
who are the same individual (mean DUAL = 0.185). Further, 70% of ﬁrms operate in regions with a high rate
of marketization, and only 5.4% grant stock options to their top executives (average Option value = 0.054).
Table 3 presents the correlation coeﬃcients between the main variables. GAP is positively related to ﬁrm
performance. The correlation coeﬃcient between GAP_1 and GAP_2 is 0.597, signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
Table 4
Univariate comparisons of SOE and non-SOE subsamples.
Variable Non-SOE SOE Mean diﬀerence
No. of observations Mean No. of observations Mean
Panel A
CEOPAY 4031 518305.300 5155 522105.800 3800.443
VPMPAY 4031 290198.800 5155 347235.200 57037.430***
PL 4031 0.472 5155 0.570 0.098***
GAP_1 4031 11.707 5155 11.431 0.277***
GAP_2 4031 1.800 5155 1.519 0.281***
ROA 4031 0.047 5155 0.035 0.012***
TOBINQ 4031 1.856 5155 1.626 0.230***
Option 4031 0.102 5155 0.017 0.086***
Variable Non-SOE Mean diﬀerence
PL = 1 PL = 0
No. of observations Mean No. of observations Mean
Panel B
GAP_1 2129 11.168 1902 12.312 1.144***
GAP_2 2129 1.736 1902 1.871 0.135***
Variable SOE Mean diﬀerence
PL = 1 PL = 0
No. of observations Mean No. of observations Mean
Panel C
GAP_1 2219 10.840 2936 11.878 1.037***
GAP_2 2219 1.546 2936 1.498 0.048***
Note: CEOPAY is the pay of the CEO, and VPMPAY is the median pay of non-CEOs.
* Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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related to GAP_1 and uncorrelated with GAP_2. SOE is negatively related to GAP.
Table 4 reports the results of univariate analysis for the diﬀerent ownership subsamples. Panel A presents
the comparison for the main variables. Average CEO pay does not diﬀer between the SOE and non-SOE sub-
samples, although the average non-CEO pay of the non-SOE sample is signiﬁcantly lower than that of the
SOE sample. These results show clearly that the TMT pay gap is much greater in non-SOEs than in SOEs,
and are also consistent with the view that TMTs in SOEs are more egalitarian. Further, SOE TMTs enjoy
a higher pay level, but exhibit weaker ﬁrm performance, than their non-SOE counterparts. Panels B and C
show the relationship between TMT pay gap and pay level in non-SOEs and SOEs, respectively. In non-
SOEs, a higher TMT pay level is accompanied by a larger pay gap, whereas in SOEs, a higher TMT pay level
is associated with a larger absolute pay gap (GAP_1) but a smaller relative pay gap (GAP_2).4.2. Top management team pay level and pay gap
Table 5 presents the estimation results of model (1). Panels A and B show the regression results for account-
ing performance (ROA) and market performance (TOBINQ), respectively, with columns 4 and 8 reporting the
IV regression results.12 The results in column 1 of Panels A and B show that if TMT pay level (PL) is not
controlled for, GAP is signiﬁcantly positively related to ﬁrm performance at the 1% level, which is consistent12 We use the IVs stated above. We present only the second-stage IV regression results here.
Table 5
Relationship between ﬁrm performance and TMT pay level and TMT pay gap.
ROA/GAP_1 ROA/GAP_2
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
Constant 0.194*** 0.129*** 0.113*** 0.235*** 0.178*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.161***
(9.613) (6.230) (5.074) (7.518) (8.758) (5.158) (4.960) (6.859)
GAP 0.00666*** 0.00374*** 0.00232*** 0.00723*** 0.000225 0.0000444 0.00202* 0.00556**
(13.020) (6.517) (2.760) (4.225) (0.273) (0.055) (1.654) (2.271)
PL 0.0146*** 0.0166 0.105*** 0.0182*** 0.0118*** 0.0142**
(12.476) (1.338) (4.023) (17.565) (4.333) (2.173)
GAP  PL 0.00272** 0.00750*** 0.00388** 0.00976***
(2.531) (3.333) (2.449) (2.599)
SOE 0.00608*** 0.00732*** 0.00724*** 0.00321** 0.00768*** 0.00837*** 0.00824*** 0.00733***
(4.833) (5.799) (5.736) (2.205) (5.956) (6.547) (6.451) (5.217)
LEV 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(29.418) (28.960) (29.067) (34.225) (30.038) (29.138) (29.160) (35.232)
SGROW 0.0227*** 0.0225*** 0.0226*** 0.0235*** 0.0230*** 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 0.0230***
(14.495) (14.479) (14.510) (17.650) (14.406) (14.431) (14.416) (18.040)
SIZE 0.00877*** 0.00721*** 0.00712*** 0.00991*** 0.0109*** 0.00778*** 0.00774*** 0.0104***
(12.073) (9.825) (9.656) (13.587) (15.216) (10.635) (10.577) (14.776)
TOP1 0.000209*** 0.000211*** 0.000215*** 0.000222*** 0.000172*** 0.000195*** 0.000198*** 0.000186***
(5.695) (5.806) (5.900) (5.264) (4.656) (5.350) (5.436) (4.554)
CEOAge 0.00146 0.000143 0.0000292 0.00489 0.00464 0.000919 0.000846 0.00648
(0.370) (0.036) (0.007) (1.030) (1.158) (0.234) (0.215) (1.407)
INDEPB 0.0328*** 0.0350*** 0.0341*** 0.0318*** 0.0335*** 0.0359*** 0.0352*** 0.0350***
(2.993) (3.214) (3.135) (2.629) (3.051) (3.297) (3.238) (3.002)
BOARD 0.000310 0.0000650 0.0000775 0.000457 0.000321 0.00000914 0.0000199 0.000193
(1.016) (0.215) (0.256) (1.221) (1.041) (0.030) (0.066) (0.534)
DUAL 0.00248* 0.00188 0.00196 0.00549*** 0.000844 0.000986 0.00100 0.00216
(1.719) (1.318) (1.373) (3.463) (0.581) (0.690) (0.702) (1.416)
MKR 0.00430*** 0.00270** 0.00284** 0.00642*** 0.00630*** 0.00323** 0.00324** 0.00585***
(3.144) (1.987) (2.087) (4.189) (4.572) (2.364) (2.380) (3.941)
Option 0.0145*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0161*** 0.0150*** 0.0129*** 0.0128*** 0.0144***
(8.068) (7.272) (7.234) (6.538) (8.259) (7.153) (7.104) (6.046)
N 9186 9186 9186 6624 9186 9186 9186 6784
Adj. R-sq 0.284 0.295 0.296 0.234 0.270 0.292 0.292 0.268
TOBINQ/GAP_1 TOBINQ/GAP_2
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B
Constant 7.093*** 7.886*** 8.433*** 7.240*** 7.192*** 7.920*** 7.997*** 7.979***
(19.845) (20.909) (21.065) (11.982) (20.232) (21.608) (21.733) (17.436)
GAP 0.0414*** 0.00603 0.0422*** 0.0549* 0.00778 0.00597 0.0368* 0.0880*
(4.141) (0.543) (2.684) (1.658) (0.518) (0.402) (1.931) (1.843)
PL 0.177*** 0.882*** 1.866*** 0.183*** 0.0513 0.476***
(8.073) (3.941) (3.702) (9.309) (1.039) (3.736)
GAP  PL 0.0922*** 0.134*** 0.0804*** 0.232***
(4.700) (3.086) (2.824) (3.163)
SOE 0.0801*** 0.0650*** 0.0679*** 0.148*** 0.0718*** 0.0649*** 0.0675*** 0.118***
(3.529) (2.854) (2.988) (5.247) (3.142) (2.846) (2.964) (4.293)
LEV 0.387*** 0.358*** 0.366*** 0.422*** 0.406*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 0.409***
(5.995) (5.536) (5.671) (6.217) (6.280) (5.539) (5.567) (6.189)
SGROW 0.0936*** 0.0915*** 0.0939*** 0.109*** 0.0955*** 0.0916*** 0.0918*** 0.0996***
(3.372) (3.342) (3.429) (4.236) (3.447) (3.349) (3.352) (4.008)
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Table 5 (continued)
ROA/GAP_1 ROA/GAP_2
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SIZE 0.308*** 0.326*** 0.329*** 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.290***
(22.617) (23.201) (23.284) (20.889) (22.042) (23.049) (23.065) (21.120)
TOP1 0.00416*** 0.00414*** 0.00400*** 0.00415*** 0.00439*** 0.00416*** 0.00410*** 0.00434***
(6.587) (6.543) (6.330) (5.080) (6.962) (6.589) (6.500) (5.461)
CEOAge 0.0910 0.0716 0.0754 0.112 0.110 0.0723 0.0708 0.0896
(1.273) (1.005) (1.059) (1.219) (1.538) (1.018) (0.997) (0.998)
INDEPB 0.259 0.232 0.264 0.260 0.254 0.231 0.244 0.241
(1.157) (1.041) (1.188) (1.111) (1.137) (1.035) (1.093) (1.059)
BOARD 0.00536 0.00239 0.00281 0.00570 0.00554 0.00240 0.00262 0.00382
(1.040) (0.465) (0.547) (0.786) (1.074) (0.467) (0.511) (0.542)
DUAL 0.0679** 0.0607** 0.0633** 0.116*** 0.0589** 0.0603** 0.0607** 0.0818***
(2.480) (2.223) (2.326) (3.785) (2.127) (2.194) (2.209) (2.748)
MKR 0.0582** 0.0776*** 0.0731*** 0.0252 0.0458* 0.0768*** 0.0764*** 0.0416
(2.427) (3.231) (3.048) (0.851) (1.916) (3.198) (3.182) (1.440)
Option 0.159*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.191*** 0.162*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.180***
(3.503) (3.098) (3.057) (4.010) (3.564) (3.100) (3.070) (3.865)
N 9186 9186 9186 6624 9186 9186 9186 6784
Adj. R-sq 0.359 0.364 0.365 0.308 0.358 0.364 0.364 0.321
Note: Panel A shows the eﬀects on ROA, and Panel B the eﬀects on TOBINQ. We present both the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation and IV estimation results, although we show only the second-stage results of the latter. The ﬁgures in parentheses are robust
t-statistics adjusted for heteroskedasticity. We also control for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects in all models.
* Signiﬁcance level of 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level of 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance level of 0.01.
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of GAP decrease, and the R-square of the models increases. For example, in column 2 of Panel A, the coef-
ﬁcient relating GAP to ROA decreases to 0.00374 from 0.00666 (in column 1), and the R-square increases from
28.4% to 29.5%. Similarly, in column 2 of Panel B, the coeﬃcient’s inﬂuence on TOBINQ declines from 0.0414
(signiﬁcant at the 1% level) to 0.00603 (not signiﬁcant at conventional levels), and the R-square rises from
35.9% to 36.4%. These results indicate that, in addition to TMT pay gap, TMT pay level is also positively
related to ﬁrm performance.
The model in columns 2 and 6 do not consider that, in addition to its main eﬀect, TMT pay level may also
relate to ﬁrm performance through its interaction with TMT pay gap. The models in columns 3 and 7 of
Panels A and B, allow such an interaction. The estimation results indicate that the coeﬃcients of GAP  PL
are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, which suggests that the pay level can positively aﬀect pay gap-induced
incentives. These results are consistent with hypothesis H1. They indicate that the positive tournament eﬀects
of the pay gap are greater when the pay level is above the industry median.
In terms of economic signiﬁcance, taking the sample’s average total assets as an example, if a TMT’s pay
level is higher than that of its industry peers, then every 10,000-yuan increase in the pay gap raises net proﬁts
by about 42,600,000 yuan. If, in contrast, a TMT’s pay level is lower than the industry average, every
10,000-yuan increase in the pay gap boosts net proﬁts by about 19,800,000 yuan only. These results, which
are economically signiﬁcant, demonstrate that the tournament incentives induced by a pay gap are more pro-
nounced when the TMT receives average pay that exceeds the industry median pay.
Columns 4 and 8 of Panels A and B present the results of the IV regressions. The coeﬃcients of GAP  PL
are again signiﬁcantly positive, which means that after controlling for the endogeneity of GAP, PL and
GAP  PL, TMT pay level still exerts a positive eﬀect on pay gap eﬃciency, i.e., a higher pay level is more
likely to induce positive pay gap incentives. In summary, Table 5 results are consistent with the prediction
of H1.
Table 6
Relationship between ﬁrm performance and TMT pay level and TMT pay gap for SOE and non-SOE subsamples.
IV regression ROA TOBINQ
Independent
variables
SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.244*** 0.201*** 0.176*** 0.170*** 7.122*** 9.670*** 7.987*** 9.979***
(5.304) (4.015) (4.764) (3.953) (8.327) (8.521) (12.121) (11.814)
GAP_1 0.00881*** 0.00368* 0.0789 0.0343
(3.539) (1.659) (1.571) (0.626)
GAP_1  PL 0.00578 0.0115*** 0.0114 0.280***
(1.587) (3.389) (0.176) (3.274)
GAP_2 0.00249 0.00840*** 0.00304 0.136*
(0.774) (2.738) (0.040) (1.906)
GAP_2  PL 0.00415 0.0150*** 0.00140 0.354***
(0.895) (2.873) (0.013) (2.884)
PL 0.0797* 0.153*** 0.00218 0.0273*** 0.427 3.669*** 0.135 0.713***
(1.874) (3.743) (0.272) (2.852) (0.570) (3.639) (0.776) (3.207)
LEV 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.127*** 0.112*** 1.065*** 0.0712 1.034*** 0.0929
(20.324) (14.524) (20.680) (15.013) (9.828) (0.524) (9.814) (0.706)
SGROW 0.0233*** 0.0235*** 0.0226*** 0.0232*** 0.149*** 0.0649 0.137*** 0.0584
(8.285) (8.673) (7.960) (8.885) (2.893) (1.443) (2.768) (1.366)
SIZE 0.00890*** 0.00983*** 0.00976*** 0.0108*** 0.237*** 0.387*** 0.238*** 0.372***
(8.342) (5.865) (9.011) (6.609) (11.124) (11.509) (11.416) (11.513)
TOP1 0.000168*** 0.000271*** 0.000104* 0.000287*** 0.00243** 0.00799*** 0.00276*** 0.00746***
(2.902) (4.358) (1.852) (4.699) (2.288) (6.014) (2.652) (5.803)
CEOAge 0.0117 0.000480 0.0148** 0.00140 0.0703 0.0245 0.0710 0.0435
(1.595) (0.075) (2.108) (0.223) (0.566) (0.184) (0.602) (0.331)
INDEPB 0.0476*** 0.00572 0.0534*** 0.00433 0.479 0.831* 0.516* 0.896**
(3.228) (0.277) (3.757) (0.212) (1.600) (1.875) (1.772) (2.043)
BOARD 0.000310 0.000944 0.00000236 0.000902 0.000224 0.0198 0.00131 0.0206
(0.758) (1.258) (0.006) (1.223) (0.032) (1.437) (0.192) (1.522)
DUAL 0.00207 0.00556*** 0.00124 0.00286 0.0159 0.0923** 0.0112 0.0542
(0.745) (2.649) (0.462) (1.420) (0.335) (2.190) (0.235) (1.319)
MKR 0.00270 0.0110*** 0.00250 0.00987*** 0.0500 0.0287 0.0326 0.0543
(1.330) (3.850) (1.258) (3.513) (1.428) (0.481) (0.965) (0.912)
Option 0.0287*** 0.0131*** 0.0303*** 0.0111*** 0.470*** 0.191*** 0.495*** 0.171***
(5.458) (6.013) (5.886) (5.342) (3.706) (3.436) (3.930) (3.220)
N 3505 3119 3595 3189 3505 3119 3595 3189
Adj. R-sq 0.284 0.193 0.303 0.220 0.362 0.301 0.375 0.316
Note: The ﬁgures in parentheses are robust t-statistics adjusted for heteroskedasticity. We control for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects in all
models.
* Signiﬁcance level 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level of 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance level of 0.01.
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The results on the relationship between TMT pay gap and ﬁrm performance under diﬀerent ownership con-
ditions are presented in Table 6. To control for endogeneity, the table presents the IV regression results using
only the IVs stated above. Columns 1–4 show the results for ROA, and columns 5–8 the results for TOBINQ.
Table 6 shows that the coeﬃcients of GAP  PL are signiﬁcantly positive for the non-SOE subsample but
are not signiﬁcant for the SOE subsample. This result is consistent with H2, and suggests that the TMT pay
level in non-SOEs is more likely to moderate the inﬂuence of a within-TMT pay gap on ﬁrm performance.
However, the SOE TMT pay level has no eﬀect on pay gap eﬃciency, possibly because the top executives
of government-regulated SOEs are not sensitive to their external pay standing among their industry peers.
Hence, an external compensation comparison does little to change competition and cooperation within
SOE TMTs.
Table 7
Relationship between ﬁrm performance and TMT pay gap for the lowest and highest deciles of TMT pay level.
Fixed-eﬀects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Independent variables ROA TOBINQ ROA TOBINQ
SPL = 1 SPL = 10 SPL = 1 SPL = 10 PL = 0 PL = 1 PL = 0 PL = 1
Constant 0.760** 0.234* 36.80*** 6.308** 0.00398 0.0408 18.90*** 12.39***
(2.087) (1.717) (7.834) (2.127) (0.052) (0.770) (16.564) (12.662)
GAP_1 0.0109* 0.00456** 0.192*** 0.0414
(1.920) (2.392) (2.619) (0.997)
GAP_2 0.000155 0.00293** 0.0763*** 0.0339
(0.080) (2.113) (2.640) (1.325)
SOE 0.0773*** 0.00427 0.257 0.00177 0.0291*** 0.00330 0.0573 0.188**
(3.800) (0.437) (0.978) (0.008) (4.885) (0.661) (0.650) (2.035)
LEV 0.199*** 0.123*** 0.0728 0.0224 0.161*** 0.144*** 0.242* 0.0959
(5.710) (7.586) (0.162) (0.063) (17.107) (19.758) (1.735) (0.710)
SGROW 0.0200*** 0.0285*** 0.145* 0.0178 0.0197*** 0.0179*** 0.0196 0.0666***
(3.309) (7.298) (1.862) (0.209) (11.818) (13.322) (0.792) (2.685)
SIZE 0.0276** 0.00998* 1.331*** 0.338*** 0.000960 0.000608 0.837*** 0.570***
(2.227) (1.951) (8.323) (3.026) (0.352) (0.305) (20.684) (15.446)
TOP1 0.00157** 0.000426* 0.0211** 0.00300 0.000374** 0.000324*** 0.00825*** 0.000829
(2.045) (1.745) (2.142) (0.563) (2.185) (2.786) (3.245) (0.386)
CEOAge 0.0215 0.0153 1.137 0.451 0.00856 0.00690 0.0177 0.440***
(0.349) (0.746) (1.429) (1.010) (0.674) (0.849) (0.094) (2.932)
INDEPB 0.0118 0.0521 1.207 0.698 0.0362 0.0103 0.235 0.0876
(0.099) (1.339) (0.782) (0.823) (1.364) (0.563) (0.597) (0.259)
BOARD 0.00689 0.00156 0.00164 0.00319 0.000178 0.000336 0.0180 0.000991
(1.462) (1.030) (0.027) (0.097) (0.169) (0.496) (1.152) (0.079)
DUAL 0.00624 0.00539 0.552** 0.116 0.00213 0.00630** 0.0653 0.000542
(0.346) (0.897) (2.372) (0.888) (0.509) (2.090) (1.053) (0.010)
MKR 0.0105 0.0312** 0.260 0.303 0.00519 0.0138* 0.0804 0.440***
(0.277) (2.139) (0.533) (0.950) (0.570) (1.842) (0.595) (3.163)
Option 0.0101 0.00533 0.347 0.0308 0.000706 0.00225 0.169* 0.100*
(0.324) (1.128) (0.860) (0.299) (0.108) (0.802) (1.748) (1.935)
N 742 1035 742 1035 4348 4838 4348 4838
Adj. R-sq 0.405 0.241 0.140 0.094 0.215 0.142 0.196 0.153
Note: The ﬁgures in parentheses are robust t-statistics, and we also control for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects in all models.
* Signiﬁcance level 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level of 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance level of 0.01.
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5.1. Subdivision of TMT pay level
Our main focus is on the eﬀects of a TMT pay gap on ﬁrm performance under diﬀerent TMT pay level
conditions. As previously noted, ﬁrms often use their industry peers as a benchmark when agreeing contracts
with top executives (Jiang, 2011). Accordingly, we divide the TMT pay level into two groups, one with a pay
level higher than the industry median and the other with a pay level lower than the industry median, and ﬁnd a
stronger positive pay gap eﬀect on ﬁrm performance when the TMT pay level is higher than the industry
median.
In Table 5, the coeﬃcients of the relative pay gap measure GAP_2 are all signiﬁcantly negative, meaning
that when TMT members’ pay level is lower (higher) than that of their industry peers, GAP_2 is negatively
(positively) related to ﬁrm performance. Hence, we can say that the median pay level in a given industry
may be the ﬂex point for the eﬀect of a relative pay gap (i.e., GAP_2) on ﬁrm performance. However, the same
cannot be said for the absolute pay gap measure (i.e., GAP_1). GAP_1 is positively related to ﬁrm perfor-
mance in both the higher and lower pay level groups, although more strongly so in the former. To ensure that
Table 8
Relationship between ﬁrm performance and TMT pay gap for the lowest and highest deciles of TMT pay level for SOEs and non-SOEs.
Independent variables DROA DTOBINQ
SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.0804** 0.0323 0.0607** 0.0541 4.053*** 6.510*** 4.173*** 6.168***
(2.234) (0.751) (1.977) (1.406) (8.363) (9.607) (8.781) (9.964)
GAP 1t1 0.00321** 0.00168 0.00706 0.0534**
(2.146) (1.269) (0.366) (2.397)
GAP 1t1  PLt 0.00254 0.00341** 0.0291 0.0682**
(1.487) (2.043) (1.251) (2.413)
GAP 2t1 0.00279 0.00251* 0.0596 0.0359
(1.630) (1.752) (1.519) (1.320)
GAP 2t1  PLt 0.00316 0.00262 0.0855* 0.0681*
(1.408) (1.403) (1.825) (1.943)
PL 0.0363* 0.0273 0.0143*** 0.00781** 0.379 0.624* 0.174** 0.0282
(1.891) (1.429) (3.917) (2.155) (1.437) (1.894) (2.414) (0.421)
LEV 0.0679*** 0.0595*** 0.0670*** 0.0603*** 0.354*** 0.0984 0.345*** 0.104
(10.590) (7.824) (10.509) (7.933) (4.166) (0.887) (4.216) (0.945)
SGROW 0.0208*** 0.0252*** 0.0206*** 0.0248*** 0.0210 0.0571 0.0255 0.0614
(7.778) (10.013) (7.956) (10.181) (0.544) (1.213) (0.690) (1.351)
SIZE 0.00318*** 0.00318** 0.00338*** 0.00360** 0.145*** 0.255*** 0.144*** 0.257***
(3.691) (2.050) (3.920) (2.347) (8.935) (10.411) (9.305) (10.694)
TOP1 0.0000157 0.000129** 0.0000177 0.000146*** 0.0000156 0.00102 0.000154 0.000765
(0.331) (2.465) (0.379) (2.795) (0.018) (0.940) (0.187) (0.710)
CEOAge 0.00693 0.00346 0.00818 0.00322 0.0351 0.0485 0.0645 0.0738
(1.115) (0.591) (1.335) (0.563) (0.345) (0.483) (0.656) (0.738)
INDEPB 0.0251** 0.0100 0.0258** 0.00773 0.295 0.271 0.334 0.298
(2.079) (0.539) (2.171) (0.420) (1.267) (0.866) (1.484) (0.960)
BOARD 0.0000926 0.000317 0.0000881 0.000128 0.00136 0.0129 0.000141 0.0122
(0.280) (0.488) (0.259) (0.198) (0.246) (1.345) (0.026) (1.283)
DUAL 0.000697 0.00371** 0.000673 0.00329* 0.0362 0.00112 0.0276 0.00871
(0.283) (1.963) (0.274) (1.755) (0.992) (0.034) (0.757) (0.271)
MKR 0.000559 0.00421 0.000598 0.00371 0.00880 0.0463 0.00655 0.0539
(0.326) (1.615) (0.354) (1.431) (0.332) (1.026) (0.254) (1.189)
Option 0.0174*** 0.00661*** 0.0179*** 0.00580*** 0.235*** 0.0250 0.253*** 0.0366
(4.659) (3.898) (4.833) (3.410) (2.592) (0.662) (2.769) (0.980)
ROAt1 0.535*** 0.608*** 0.529*** 0.610***
(16.571) (16.573) (16.617) (16.874)
TOBINQt1 0.372*** 0.335*** 0.370*** 0.341***
(14.116) (13.165) (14.332) (13.441)
N 3505 3119 3595 3189 3477 2990 3566 3058
Adj. R-sq 0.317 0.350 0.315 0.356 0.528 0.502 0.530 0.503
Note: The ﬁgures in parentheses are robust t-statistics adjusted by heteroskedasticity, and we also control for year and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects in all models.
* Signiﬁcance at the 0.1 level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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pay level. We ﬁrst arrange it in ascending order for each year and each industry, and then divide the sample
into 10 pay level groups. Firms in the ﬁrst group (SPL = 1) have the lowest pay level relative to their peers,
i.e., lower than 90% of ﬁrms in the same industry, whereas those in the tenth group (SPL = 10) have the high-
est such pay level, i.e., higher than 90% of ﬁrms in the same industry. We then estimate model (3) separately
for each of the 10 groups to examine the absolute TMT pay gap’s inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance.1313 The control variables in (3) are the same as those in model (1), and (3) also controls for ﬁxed eﬀects.
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We also estimate model (3) for the PL = 0 and PL = 1 subsamples separately to examine the relative TMT
pay gap’s (GAP_2) inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance. The results are presented in Table 7.
Columns 1–4 of Table 7 show GAP_1’s eﬀects on ﬁrm performance in the highest and lowest pay level
groups. In the lowest group (SPL = 1), GAP_1 is negatively related to ﬁrm performance, whereas in the high-
est (SPL = 10), it is positively related. These results are consistent with H1. Columns 5–8 show GAP_2’s inﬂu-
ence on ﬁrm performance in the higher- and lower-than-industry-median pay level groups. If a ﬁrm’s pay level
is lower (higher) than the median level, GAP_2 is negatively (positively) related to ﬁrm performance. These
results are consistent with those in Table 5, and further suggest that the direction of a pay gap’s inﬂuence
on ﬁrm performance changes from negative to positive with an increase in pay level, which is consistent with
H1.
5.2. Endogeneity of TMT pay level and TMT pay gap
In addition to the 2SLS regression approach with IVs, we use a model with change in performance
(DPERF) as the dependent variable and lagged pay gap as the independent variable to control for endogeneity.
A TMT pay gap in the previous year is less likely to be caused by performance growth in the current year, and
the TMT pay level is less endogenous with performance growth than with current year performance. Hence,
we adopt model (4) to examine the inﬂuence of the previous year’s pay gap on performance growth under dif-
ferent ownership conditions.DPERF t ¼ b0 þ b1GAP t1 þ b2PLt þ b3GAPt1  PLt þ b4PERF t1 þ b5SOEt þ b6LEV t þ b7SGROW t
þ b8SIZEt þ b9TOP1t þ b10CEOAget þ b11BOARDt þ b12INDEPBt þ b13DUALt
þ b14MKRt þ b15Optiont þ
X
Industryt þ
X
Yeart þ et ð4ÞThe variables are deﬁned as before, and we also control for the previous year’s performance. The results of
model (4) for the diﬀerent ownership conditions are presented in Table 8. They show that the interaction term
GAP t1  PLt is signiﬁcantly positive for the non-SOE subsample and insigniﬁcantly negative for the SOE sub-
sample. Hence, when the pay level of a TMT in a non-SOE is higher than the industry median, a larger TMT
pay gap brings about more performance growth. For SOEs, in contrast, a higher pay level does not induce
better TMT tournament incentives. When these ﬁrms’ TMTs receive less pay than their peers, a within-
TMT pay gap may be conducive to performance growth.14
The results are consistent if we remove observations for which the TMT’s pay standing relative to industry
peers changed. We also use a lagged pay level with pay gap to re-examine model (1) under diﬀerent ownership
conditions, and the results are consistent with those in Tables 6 and 7. All of these results provide further sup-
port for H2.
We also use several other methods to re-measure TMT pay level and ﬁnd consistent results. To exclude the
eﬀects of high CEO pay, we re-deﬁne TMT pay level without the CEO’s pay and ﬁnd consistent results. Addi-
tionally, we also use only the top three executives’ pay or excess TMT pay to measure the TMT pay level, and
ﬁnd consistent results.
6. Additional analyses
According to the descriptive data in Table 4, the TMT pay levels in SOEs are much higher than those in
non-SOEs in the same industry. Many Chinese scholars have suggested that the excess pay levels of SOEs are
not conducive to ﬁrm eﬃciency because top executives’ pay is regulated by the government (Wu et al., 2010; Lis later suggested that the interaction’s negative coeﬃcients are all in central SOEs.
Table 9
Relationship between ﬁrm performance and TMT pay gap and TMT pay level for central SOEs and local SOEs: 2SLS-IV estimation.
IV regression Central SOE Local SOE
Independent variables ROA TOBINQ ROA TOBINQ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.386*** 0.209*** 2.647 4.269*** 0.259*** 0.198*** 8.514*** 8.874***
(3.575) (2.859) (1.366) (2.801) (5.411) (5.158) (10.234) (13.111)
GAP_1 0.0174** 0.312** 0.0102*** 0.0571
(2.535) (2.534) (3.718) (1.200)
GAP_1  PL 0.00758 0.339*** 0.00902** 0.134**
(1.042) (2.598) (2.521) (2.154)
GAP_2 0.0171 1.295** 0.00247 0.0355
(0.775) (2.371) (0.656) (0.537)
GAP_2  PL 0.0161 1.476** 0.00249 0.0316
(0.659) (2.446) (0.337) (0.244)
PL 0.0677 0.0324 3.082** 1.740* 0.125*** 0.000466 1.798** 0.00833
(0.862) (0.861) (2.186) (1.866) (3.045) (0.040) (2.508) (0.041)
LEV 0.107*** 0.108*** 1.365*** 1.417*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.913*** 0.916***
(11.623) (12.204) (8.244) (8.177) (22.553) (23.441) (8.744) (9.069)
SGROW 0.0227*** 0.0210*** 0.0666 0.0462 0.0229*** 0.0221*** 0.182*** 0.165***
(6.732) (6.506) (1.102) (0.739) (10.277) (10.481) (4.684) (4.439)
SIZE 0.00698*** 0.00606*** 0.126*** 0.143*** 0.0108*** 0.0119*** 0.288*** 0.274***
(3.800) (3.608) (3.822) (4.399) (9.477) (10.858) (14.528) (14.230)
TOP1 0.0000327 0.0000241 0.00939*** 0.0102*** 0.000203*** 0.000110* 0.0000616 0.00106
(0.307) (0.228) (4.914) (4.992) (3.007) (1.734) (0.052) (0.950)
CEOAge 0.0310** 0.0295** 0.0458 0.00991 0.00234 0.00976 0.131 0.141
(2.252) (2.235) (0.185) (0.039) (0.276) (1.196) (0.890) (0.979)
INDEPB 0.0402 0.0484* 0.544 0.562 0.0503*** 0.0496*** 0.515 0.580*
(1.364) (1.736) (1.029) (1.033) (2.598) (2.684) (1.529) (1.781)
BOARD 0.000634 0.000748 0.00251 0.0104 0.000978* 0.000379 0.00235 0.000317
(0.750) (0.913) (0.166) (0.655) (1.770) (0.725) (0.245) (0.035)
DUAL 0.000292 0.000615 0.00862 0.0851 0.00402 0.000841 0.00846 0.0413
(0.049) (0.103) (0.080) (0.722) (1.332) (0.291) (0.161) (0.814)
Option 0.00885 0.0110 0.0404 0.00398 0.0388*** 0.0392*** 0.667*** 0.683***
(0.822) (1.052) (0.209) (0.020) (5.893) (6.149) (5.816) (6.100)
MKR 0.00282 0.00169 0.222*** 0.137* 0.00199 0.000422 0.0110 0.00937
(0.724) (0.427) (3.172) (1.740) (0.865) (0.192) (0.275) (0.242)
N 1012 1038 1012 1012 2493 2557 2493 2557
Adj. R-sq 0.231 0.270 0.347 0.308 0.283 0.332 0.359 0.378
Note: The ﬁgures in parentheses are robust t-statistics, and we also control for year and industry in all models.
* Signiﬁcance level of 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance level of 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance level of 0.01.
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eration, and thus should be addressed as the next step in China’s ongoing comprehensive SOE reform. On 29
August 2014, the country’s Central Political Bureau passed the Pay System Reform Program of Central Man-
agement Companies’ Responsible Person, which was formally implemented on 1 January 2015. The program
requires that the ﬁrst 72 central SOE top executives receive a pay cut, thereby setting an example for local
SOE pay reform. However, the program does not provide the detailed rules on how the pay cuts should be
carried out or stipulate whether the internal pay distribution should be considered. Moreover, it is also impor-
tant to discuss what notiﬁcations local SOEs should be given when they consider central SOEs’ approach to
top executive compensation reform.
As previously noted, if a company’s pay incentive system is eﬀective, the TMT pay level will moderate the
TMT pay gap’s eﬃciency. Thus, ﬁrms should consider choosing a suitable pay gap to ensure a certain pay
standing in the industry. Because SOEs are regulated by the government, their industry pay standing is not
Y. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 115–135 133related to the market. Hence, cutting their top managers’ pay should not directly hurt the eﬃciency of an inter-
nal pay gap. However, this is not true for all SOEs because, in China, central and local SOEs are subject to
diﬀerent constraints (Xia and Fang, 2005), diﬀerent levels of government intervention (Pan et al., 2008), and
diﬀerent pay systems. Although they both belong to the state-owned system, their top managers’ preferences
concerning monetary compensation diﬀer, leading to diﬀerent degrees of sensitivity to the ﬁrm’s external pay
standing. Thus, we re-estimate model (1) separately for central SOEs and local SOEs. The results are presented
in Table 9. For consistency, we present only the results of the 2SLS regression with the IVs stated above.
Columns 1–4 of Table 9 report the results for central SOEs. The eﬀect of a TMT pay gap on accounting
performance (ROA) does not diﬀer in the diﬀerent pay level groups, although the pay gap’s eﬀect on market
performance (TOBINQ) is stronger when the pay level is lower, which suggests that reducing the compensa-
tion of top managers in central SOEs is actually beneﬁcial to ﬁrm value. When these SOEs implement pay
cutting measures, their internal TMT pay gap could be raised.
Columns 5–8 of Table 9 present the results for local SOEs, showing that a higher TMT pay level is bene-
ﬁcial to the incentives induced by an absolute pay gap, but has little eﬀect on those induced by a relative pay
gap. These results suggest that in a local SOE, the TMT’s pay level inﬂuences within-team competition and
cooperation to some degree. Thus, when local SOEs engage in top manager compensation reform, direct
pay cuts may not be the best approach. For those with a high pay level, increasing the internal pay gap
may be a good solution to boost eﬃciency.
In summary, our results suggest that the pay cutting policy currently being implemented in China’s SOEs
will not damage the internal eﬃciency of a central SOE TMT, but local SOEs should not blindly follow the
pay cutting decisions of their central counterparts. Because the pay level in local SOE TMTs can also aﬀect
within-team pay gap eﬃciency, the redistribution of payments within the TMT may be the optimal solution.
In addition, we ﬁnd the TMT pay level in local SOEs to have modulating eﬀects in regions with a higher mar-
ketization level and in more competitive industries. We do not tabulate the results of these regressions because
of space limitations.
7. Conclusion
Although the incentive eﬀects of a TMT pay gap have received considerable research attention, the results
of prior research are conﬂicting. These conﬂicting results are consistent with the two dominant theories in this
area, namely tournament theory and social comparison theory, which make conﬂicting predictions. One expla-
nation for the conﬂicting ﬁndings is that each of these theories holds, but only under speciﬁc conditions. TMT
pay level concerns an external comparison and TMT pay gap an internal comparison. Most of the literature
examine the eﬃciency of these two components of the pay system separately, with few studies noting that an
external comparison also inﬂuences the internal comparison. Moreover, ﬁrms often use the market pay level in
their industry as a benchmark in designing their own TMT pay contracts.
The mandatory requirement that Chinese listed ﬁrms provide information on their top executives’ compen-
sation, makes it possible to conduct external comparisons and to also study whether these external compar-
isons have implications for the managerial incentive and ﬁrm performance eﬀects of internal comparisons.
Using compensation data from 2005 to 2012, we examine the eﬀects of TMT pay level on within-team pay
gap eﬃciency. Our results show that a higher TMT pay level than that of the team’s industry peers stimulates
within-team competence, and thus indicates that tournament theory may be more suitable than social compar-
ison theory for explaining the incentives of a pay gap. A lower TMT pay level than industry peers, in contrast,
renders top executives more sensitive to an internal pay gap because they perceive their pay to be unfair.
Accordingly, social comparison theory provides a more suitable explanation under these circumstances.
Therefore, when ﬁrms are designing contracts for top executives, it is important that they both adjust the
pay level to suit the market and ensure an appropriate within-TMT pay distribution, which is vital to the
pay system as a whole. For example, the Chinese listed ﬁrm Everfine Photo (stock ID: 300306) emphasizes
in its 2012 annual report that ‘‘the ﬁrm has implemented [a] new reward system, [and] the top managers’
pay . . . keep[s] up with the market, and should make dynamic maintenance of the pay gap and pay level every
year according to the market level. . ..”
134 Y. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 115–135However, because of government regulation, providing SOE top managers with excess compensation is not
only unfavorable to ﬁrm performance (Wu et al., 2010), but also fails to stimulate internal TMT competition.
As noted earlier, a reform of the pay system for central SOEs has been in eﬀect since 1 January 2015, and
consequently the majority of these ﬁrms’ top executives will receive a pay cut. Our ﬁndings suggest that such
pay cuts will not adversely aﬀect the incentives induced by an internal pay gap and may even boost ﬁrm value,
although the same does not hold true for local SOEs. The top managers of central and local SOEs face dif-
ferent degrees of government intervention, market competition and other factors, with the former group’s pay
system being more market-oriented. Directly cutting pay is likely to be detrimental to the incentives induced
by an internal TMT pay gap in local SOEs. For high-paying local SOEs, widening the internal pay gap may be
a solution to boosting eﬃciency.
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